Fact Check: Is the Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum 'Illegal and Without Legal Basis'? The Law, the Greece–Egypt Deal and Ankara's Offer to Cairo

Why It Matters

On 28 October 2026, after meeting UN Secretary-General António Guterres in New York, Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis said maritime disputes must be settled under international law and, as reported by To Vima, described the Türkiye–Libya memorandum as illegal and without legal basis, citing Greece's close ties with Egypt.

Short answer: a bilateral continental shelf and EEZ agreement between two coastal states is lawful in principle. Customary law, reflected in UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83, requires delimitation by agreement to reach an equitable solution. What remains genuinely disputed is the memorandum's geographic reach, the effect of Greek islands, and its impact on third states.

Al Jazeera, in a report published on 29 October, says Ankara is building closer political and military ties with the leadership of eastern Libya, and that Türkiye's Ministry of National Defence (MSB) on Wednesday renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. This fact check attributes each item to its outlet. It tests the word 'illegal' against treaty text, UN filings and ICJ judgments, not against political rhetoric. For the wider doctrine, see our guide to Blue Homeland Mavi Vatan doctrine explained.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

The memorandum signed on 27 November 2019 by Türkiye and Libya's Government of National Accord delimits maritime jurisdiction between Türkiye's southern coast and Libya's north-eastern coast. Its equity is contested, but as a bilateral delimitation it can bind only its two parties, and no international court has endorsed or annulled it.

What the 27 November 2019 memorandum actually delimits

The instrument is titled 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean'. It fixes a boundary line by geographic coordinates for the continental shelf and EEZ claimed by the two states between their coasts. Turkish MFA and Presidency statements present it as a delimitation between Türkiye's southern coast and Libya's north-eastern coast, not as a claim over any third state's land territory.

The word 'memorandum' does not make it non-binding. In Qatar v. Bahrain (1994), the ICJ held that the form and title of an instrument are not decisive if it records commitments creating rights and obligations. Both signatories treat the text as a binding delimitation.

Libyan domestic approval is contested and has shifted. The counterpart was the Tripoli-based, UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj. Eastern Libyan institutions, including the House of Representatives in Tobruk, publicly rejected the text in 2019–2020. Al Jazeera now reports that Ankara has won backing for the agreement from former adversaries in eastern Libya. We do not assert a ratification date or procedure here. Readers should consult Libya's own filings and the exchange of notes verbales with the UN Secretary-General, collected by the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).

Is the memorandum 'illegal'? What international law says

The rule is the same for UNCLOS parties and non-parties. Delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is effected by agreement, on the basis of international law, to achieve an equitable solution. UNCLOS Articles 74 (EEZ) and 83 (continental shelf) codify this, and the ICJ has treated the equitable-solution requirement as customary. The ICJ case law adds four points:

• North Sea Continental Shelf (1969): delimitation is by agreement in accordance with equitable principles. Equidistance is not a mandatory customary rule for states that are not bound by the 1958 Convention.
• Tunisia/Libya (1982): the result must be equitable, assessed through relevant circumstances such as coastal geography.
• Libya/Malta (1985): the Court applied a provisional median line and then adjusted it for the disparity in coastal lengths, using proportionality as a check. It also confined its decision to areas where third-state claims were not engaged.
• Romania v. Ukraine (2009): Serpents' Island was given no effect on the maritime boundary beyond its territorial sea, to avoid a disproportionate result.

The Greek argument. Athens argues that Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo are islands entitled under UNCLOS Article 121(2) to a continental shelf and EEZ like other land territory. In its view, Greek islands lie between the Turkish and Libyan coasts, so no 'opposite coasts' boundary can be drawn without crossing Greek entitlements. On the third-party objection, Athens says the memorandum disregards Greece's rights and is unopposable to it. It also points to its 2020 agreement with Egypt. These are Athens' stated positions, to be read in its own MFA statements and UN notes.

Ankara's counter-argument. Ankara argues that islands cannot cut off the maritime projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean (870 km / 540 mi). In its view, equity and proportionality, as applied in Libya/Malta and Romania v. Ukraine, support reduced or no effect for small islands lying close to a larger mainland coast. Kastellorizo, for example, lies about 2 km (1.2 mi) off Türkiye's coast. Ankara adds that the memorandum does not claim areas belonging to Greece's mainland shelf.

What is legally settled and what is disputed:

• Settled: states may delimit by agreement; a treaty binds only its parties (pacta tertiis, VCLT Article 34); form does not determine bindingness.
• Settled: an agreement cannot extinguish a third state's valid rights. If Greece holds the entitlement it claims, the memorandum cannot remove it.
• Genuinely disputed: how much effect Crete, Karpathos, Kasos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo should receive, and the resulting Greece–Libya and Greece–Türkiye boundaries.
• Not decided: no court or tribunal has endorsed the memorandum, and none has declared it invalid.

The Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement of 6 August 2020

The Greece–Egypt text is partial, so it does not settle the wider Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye's objection is that it ignores Turkish and Libyan shelf rights. Greece's position is that it applies international law between states with opposite coasts. Neither claim has been adjudicated.

Türkiye also objects to Egypt's 2003 EEZ agreement with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). Ankara says that agreement overlapped Türkiye's continental shelf, with GCASC Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 falling within it, and that it ignored Turkish Cypriot rights. Egypt's current position needs careful primary-source wording. It should be quoted from Egyptian MFA statements and Egypt's notes to the UN, not from paraphrase, and we attribute to Al Jazeera only what it reports. Our network analyses, such as The Political Anatomy on whether maritime agreements bind third states and Politics Beyond Borders on Cairo's rejection, cover this in depth. They come from the same publisher network and are not independent sources.

What the MSB's renewed offer to Egypt means

According to Al Jazeera, on Wednesday 28 October the Ministry of National Defence renewed Türkiye's offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. We rely on Al Jazeera's account, and the exact wording should be checked against the MSB's briefing record. The offer fits a long-standing Turkish line that delimitation should be by agreement on equitable principles. It also fits Türkiye's record of filings:

• 18 March 2020: Türkiye registered the outer limits of its continental shelf with the United Nations.
• 16 April and 12 June 2025: Türkiye unveiled its 'Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye' and registered it with IOC-UNESCO (see Türkiye's 2025 Marine Spatial Planning and the IOC-UNESCO Registration).
• 2020: President Erdoğan proposed an Eastern Mediterranean Conference including all littoral states and the Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of Cyprus, hold equal rights over offshore resources. The Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement of 21 September 2011 reflects that. See also Cyprus and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Solution.

Third-state rights, the EU and UNCLOS non-party status

The EU and Greece argue that the memorandum violates the 'sovereign rights of third states'. That is a serious claim and should be read in the European Council conclusions of December 2019 and the Greek notes to the UN. Two points of law qualify it. First, a bilateral treaty cannot bind a third state, so any violation depends on a third state's entitlement actually existing, and that is the very point in dispute. Second, delimitation under Articles 74 and 83 is a matter between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. The EU is not a coastal state, and political conclusions do not adjudicate delimitation. Binding settlement is through negotiation or a competent court or tribunal. The same logic applies to the maximalist chart debated in Seville map Greece Turkey maritime claims explained.

Non-party status does not change this. Türkiye voted against adopting UNCLOS in 1982 and is not a party. Libya, Greece and Egypt are parties, but the equitable-solution rule in Articles 74 and 83 is customary, and North Sea (1969) was decided between states bound only by custom. See Fact Check: Does Türkiye's Non-Party Status to UNCLOS Void Its Maritime Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean?. Ankara's own position is that custom, not every UNCLOS provision, governs, particularly on islands. Our companion Archive of Nations analysis of the memorandum text sets out the legal basis and the objections.

Source Comparison

Greek and international outlets frame the memorandum chiefly as an illegality issue, while Turkish primary sources frame it as a delimitation by agreement. Treaty texts, UN notes and ICJ judgments show the legal questions are narrower than either rhetorical frame suggests.

The fair reading is that neither side can cite a ruling in its favour. 'Illegal' overstates the case against a bilateral delimitation treaty. 'Settled' overstates the case for the line, because island effect and third-party entitlements are unresolved. Our Fact Check Desk applies the same standard across topics, and our Editorial Principles explain how we attribute claims.

Key Terms & Related Guides

The terms below are used throughout the Eastern Mediterranean maritime debate. These definitions follow treaty and ICJ usage.

• Continental shelf / EEZ: seabed and water-column rights up to 200 nautical miles, delimited by agreement (UNCLOS Articles 83 and 74).
• Equitable solution / proportionality: the ICJ test of whether a boundary result is fair given coastal geography and coast lengths.
• Pacta tertiis: the rule that a treaty does not create obligations or rights for third states.
• GCASC: the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus; TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine, explained in Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Law.

Related guides: Fact Check: Does the Seville Map Reflect International Law?, Why the Cyprus Federation Model Failed, and About The Polity Brief. A network view of the Seville chart is at The Geopolitical Compass.

The Polity Brief presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. — The Polity Brief Editorial Team