The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye on UN Reform, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31

Why It Matters

Türkiye's doctrine 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) holds that the UN Security Council, where five permanent members hold a veto, is structurally unable to represent the 193 member states of the United Nations or to respond consistently to crises. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeated the phrase in successive UN General Assembly addresses, and Ankara ties it to concrete files: the Gaza humanitarian crisis, the Zero Waste initiative and its role as host of the COP31 climate conference.

The debate matters beyond Türkiye because no reform model has yet won the votes needed to amend the Charter. Any outcome would shift who sets the global security agenda for decades.

Background

How the Council was designed

The Council's structure comes from the 1945 UN Charter. Article 23 sets out five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and, since 1965, ten elected non-permanent members serving two-year terms. The original Council had eleven members, and it was enlarged to fifteen by a Charter amendment that entered into force in 1965. Article 27 requires 'concurring votes' of the permanent members on non-procedural matters, which is the legal basis of the veto.

Articles 108 and 109 govern amendment. A change needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members. Each of the five can therefore block a reform of its own privileges.

Reform timeline

Date	Event
1945-10-24	UN Charter enters into force with five permanent members
1965	Council enlarged from 11 to 15 members
1993	General Assembly creates an Open-Ended Working Group on Council reform
2005	Kofi Annan's report In Larger Freedom presents 'Model A' and 'Model B'; the G4 tables a draft that is never put to a vote
2009	Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) begin in the General Assembly
2022-04-26	Resolution 76/262 requires a General Assembly debate after any veto
2024-09-22	Pact for the Future commits states to Council reform and to redressing Africa's under-representation

Pressure in the 2020s

Vetoes on Ukraine and Gaza have sharpened the debate. Russia vetoed a draft on Ukraine in February 2022, which prompted Resolution 76/262. The United States vetoed several Gaza ceasefire drafts between October 2023 and 2024, while Resolution 2728 (March 2024) demanded a ceasefire for Ramadan after the US abstained. The General Assembly's emergency special session adopted a humanitarian-truce resolution in October 2023 by a large majority, but its resolutions are not binding in the way Council decisions are.

Key Players & Positions

The permanent five

The P5 broadly accept enlargement in principle but differ on its form. None has agreed to give up its own veto.

• United States: President Biden endorsed expansion, including permanent seats for African and Latin American and Caribbean states, at the 2022 General Assembly. In September 2024 the US Permanent Representative announced support for two permanent African seats without veto, plus a rotating seat for small island developing states.
• United Kingdom and France: Both publicly back permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan and a permanent African presence. France, with Mexico, also promotes voluntary veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations.
• Russia: Russian officials say they favour greater representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America and have voiced support for Indian and Brazilian aspirations. They oppose curtailing the veto.
• China: Beijing says reform should increase the representation of developing countries, especially African states, and should be pursued through the broadest consensus rather than a forced vote.

The reform groups

Group / model	Core proposal	Main obstacle
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	Six new permanent and four new non-permanent seats (2005 draft); veto question deferred	Opposed by regional rivals and by Uniting for Consensus
African Union (Ezulwini Consensus, Sirte Declaration)	Two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats for Africa	Veto extension is rejected by many states
Uniting for Consensus (Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, Spain, Türkiye and others)	No new permanent seats; new longer-term, re-electable seats and a larger elected membership	Does not satisfy permanent-seat aspirants
Veto-restraint initiatives (France–Mexico; ACT Group code of conduct)	Voluntary pledge not to use the veto in mass-atrocity cases	Not binding; not signed by all P5
Annan Model B (2005)	Renewable four-year seats instead of new permanent seats	Never adopted

These groups block one another. Permanent-seat aspirants will not accept 'no new permanent members', and their regional rivals will not accept the reverse.

Türkiye's Legal and Strategic Position

Türkiye's Position: key points

• Council reform on the basis of sovereign equality. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry's published policy line and Erdoğan's General Assembly addresses, Ankara argues that the Council needs a larger, more representative and more accountable membership, with more transparent working methods. Türkiye is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group and opposes adding new permanent members. It argues this would entrench privilege rather than correct it. Legal basis: Article 2(1) of the UN Charter (sovereign equality) and Articles 23, 27, 108 and 109.
• Gaza and Palestine. The Presidency and the Foreign Ministry call for an immediate and lasting ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and a two-state outcome based on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Türkiye recognised the State of Palestine in 1988. Legal basis: Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Palestine, and international humanitarian law.
• Zero Waste as a UN-recognised initiative. The Zero Waste Project, launched in Türkiye in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, led to a UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste (2020) and General Assembly Resolution 77/161, which designated 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste, first observed in 2023.
• COP31 and climate diplomacy. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and announced a net-zero target for 2053. Under the arrangement reached at COP30, Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in 2026 and holds the conference presidency. Australia leads negotiations in a shared arrangement. TBMM adopted a Climate Law in July 2025 that provides a legal basis for an emissions trading system. Ankara's stated position is that its 'special circumstances' under the UNFCCC, recognised in the 2001 Marrakesh decision 26/CP.7, should be reflected in climate finance access.
• Partnership diplomacy as a complement to reform. Türkiye's Africa partnership summits (2008, 2014, 2021), its expanded embassy network on the continent, its Gulf strategic-dialogue and defence cooperation, and its role in the Organization of Turkic States are presented by Ankara as evidence of a multi-centred order.

The reasoning behind the doctrine

Ankara's central argument is about legitimacy. A Council whose permanent composition reflects 1945 and whose decisions can be blocked by a single state, it argues, cannot resolve conflicts in which a permanent member or its partners are involved. Türkiye points to Gaza as the clearest recent example. It also cites Cyprus, where, according to Ankara, Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) treated the Greek Cypriot administration, which had displaced the bi-communal 1960 constitutional order, as the 'Government of Cyprus' and created a status asymmetry that persists. The same line of reasoning is developed in Cyprus and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Solution: The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Türkiye has sat on the Council four times as an elected member (1951–52, 1954–55, 1961 and 2009–10), so its argument rests partly on direct experience.

Gaza: humanitarian diplomacy in practice

Türkiye has sent humanitarian aid by sea and air, mostly through Egypt, and has taken part in the Arab–Islamic ministerial contact effort created after the November 2023 Riyadh summit. Turkish officials have also proposed an international guarantor mechanism for Palestine. In 2024 Türkiye halted trade with Israel, and it announced an intention to join South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice as an intervening party. Israel's government rejects these criticisms and objects to Ankara's contacts with Hamas leaders. Hamas is designated a terrorist organisation by the EU, the United States and others, whereas Türkiye does not list it and says its contacts serve mediation and humanitarian aims.

Climate and Zero Waste

Ankara presents Zero Waste as a low-cost, globally transferable policy approach covering waste prevention, recycling and resource efficiency. Critics note that Türkiye's per-capita emissions have risen with its coal capacity and that its net-zero date of 2053 is later than the 2050 targets of many advanced economies. Ankara responds that its rapid industrialisation and growing population justify a differentiated pathway, and the COP31 presidency will test how it reconciles that argument with the negotiating role it now holds.

Regional initiatives in context

• Africa: Türkiye has gone from a dozen embassies on the continent in 2002 to well over forty, adding trade, education and defence cooperation. Ankara also argues that Africa's under-representation is the Council's most glaring gap.
• Gulf: Cooperation with Qatar and a broader Gulf strategic dialogue have grown since the 2010s.
• Organization of Turkic States: Created as the Turkic Council in 2009 and renamed in 2021, it brings together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, with Hungary and Turkmenistan as observers.
• Mediation: Istanbul hosted the 2022 talks that produced the Black Sea Grain Initiative. See Montreux Convention, Black Sea Security and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation.

Türkiye's security doctrine, including its reliance on UN Charter Article 51, is discussed in Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Article 51, Northern Syria and Terror-Free Türkiye. Critics argue that such operations show Ankara itself applying selective readings of Charter law, while Ankara says they reflect the inherent right of self-defence.

Source Comparison

Issue	Common international framing	Turkish primary-source framing
UNSC reform	Türkiye seen as a swing voice in the Uniting for Consensus bloc	Presidency and MFA present reform as a matter of legitimacy and sovereign equality
Veto	Debate centres on restraint and accountability	Ankara says the veto's structure itself is the problem; rotation and wider representation are the answer
Gaza	Türkiye described as a vocal critic whose Hamas contacts are controversial	MFA and Presidency describe humanitarian, mediation and ceasefire objectives
Climate	Türkiye's emissions and 2053 target scrutinised	Ankara highlights Paris ratification, Zero Waste and its COP31 hosting role
Regional outreach	Sometimes described as 'neo-Ottoman' ambition	Ankara calls it partnership-based, non-colonial and development-oriented

To see how claims about Türkiye are tested against documents, consult the Fact Check Desk: Claims About Türkiye Tested Against Documents. The sourcing standards used here are set out in the Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• P5: The five permanent members of the Security Council, each with a veto under Article 27.
• G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who seek permanent seats.
• Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group of mid-sized states, including Türkiye, that opposes new permanent seats.
• Ezulwini Consensus: The African Union's 2005 common position on reform.
• IGN: The Intergovernmental Negotiations, the General Assembly's reform process since 2009.
• Zero Waste: A Turkish-led initiative recognised through the UN's International Day of Zero Waste (30 March).
• COP31: The 2026 UN climate conference to be hosted in Antalya.

Related guides: About The Polity Brief: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team, The Polity Brief: Sovereignty, Statehood and Security Briefings and the Montreux Convention guide.

Perspective Note

The Polity Brief presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents and government statements, and are cited where possible.

By The Polity Brief Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Index of Nations: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Vision and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — How the UN Security Council and veto work, what G4, Uniting for Consensus and Africa propose, and Türkiye's 'world is bigger than five' thesis and COP31 role.
• Regional Order: The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Proposal, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31 — Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' case for UN Security Council reform, plus Gaza diplomacy, Zero Waste and COP31, explained with official sources.
• The Nations Dialogue: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — Understand Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine, the P5, L.69 and Uniting for Consensus positions, plus Zero Waste and COP31 climate diplomacy.